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Korea passed its turning point in international labor migration in the 1990s,
largely due to government policies aimed at rapid economic development,
industrial upgrading and coping with demographic change. From the 1960s
to the 1980s, international migration was initiated and pursued by the
government, bringing in remittances which improved the balance of pay-
ments and helped fund investment projects necessary for industrial upgrad-
ing. Rapid upgrading, coupled with demographic and social changes, have
led to a need for unskilled foreign workers on a large scale. With a large
influx of illegal workers, the Korean government now faces changing its
policy to allow unskilled workers to enter the country.
As a developing country’s industrial structure is being upgraded, labor-
intensive sectors such as the textile industry begin to lose competitiveness
in international markets and cannot attract domestic labor with the  exist-
ing wage levels. As the country’s wealth accumulates as a result of its
economic growth,  many  local workers also reject work for some sectors
which can be described as being dirty, dangerous and demanding. The
country then has to depend on foreign labor in these sectors.  In this article,
a country is seen as reaching its turning point in international migration
when it begins to accept foreign workers on a large scale for unskilled jobs
and to some extent cannot sustain its economic development without them.
Korea passed its turning point in international migration in the early
1990s. It is estimated that more than 100,000 undocumented foreign
workers are working in unskilled jobs. There are some sectors which
cannot be sustained without these foreign workers. This article aims to
analyze the factors which led to the transition in international migration in
Korea. Three issues are explored. First, it is argued that Korea has passed
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the turning point since Korea needs to accept foreign labor for unskilled
jobs for some sectors of the economy. Second,  we analyze factors which led
Korea to reach this turning point in international migration in the context
of demographic change and industrial upgrading.  Third, Korea’s overseas
employment as well as  its policy of guestworkers are also discussed in the
context of the country’s structural adjustment. Then, policy options con-
cerning foreign labor import are suggested.
Before these issues are discussed, recent developments in Korea’s
labor market are briefly reviewed. The labor market has been near full
employment despite the troubled economy of the country. In 1992, the GNP
growth rate is expected to be under five percent.  Overall employment has
been stable since the growing service sector has been absorbing labor
instead of the manufacturing sector. Proportionally fewer people have
participated in economic activities. The economically active population
increased only two percent, while that figure had risen about three percent
each year for the previous three to four years.  But the labor market began
to adjust itself by economizing human resources.  For instance, in 1993 most
of the large enterprises reduced the number of job openings for new college
graduates.
Some structural problems have also intensified. The unemployment
rates of university graduates have been far above the overall unemploy-
ment rates. This is more serious since most of the unemployed university
graduates are new entrants into the labor market. The employment outlook
for new university graduates  is even worse for the coming years. Serious
labor shortages have been observed in some sectors such as labor-intensive
small manufacturing.  Guestworkers have been proposed as an alternative.
Shortages for qualified skilled manpower have also been observed. There-
fore, in the coming years, micro-level labor policies will be more important
in managing the country’s economy.
International Migration in the Korean Context
A more well-known turning point in migration literature is the one
developed by Lewis (1954) concerning the domestic migration occurring in
a developing economy. It is said that a country reaches its turning point
when the unlimited labor supply from the traditional sector of that
economy to the modern sector is not available anymore. It is believed that
Korea passed that turning point in the mid-1970s (Bai, 1981).
International migration differs from rural-to-urban domestic migra-
tion by virtue of the separation of nation-states. In particular, these
differences are more vivid in the Korean context mainly because the
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government has played a crucial role in the fast economic development of
the last three decades.  First of all, flows and magnitudes of international
migration can be more easily influenced by the government through border
control, compared to rural-to-urban migration.  The Republic of Korea has
a policy of tight control over its borders  not only because it has been
technically at war with North Korea but also to limit the outflow of
domestic capital in order to upgrade Korea’s industrial structure.  Only in
the mid-1980s when Korea achieved a trade balance surplus did the Korean
government allow its nationals to go abroad as tourists.
Second, international migration can be used as a policy instrument in
a country’s development strategy.  Korea is one of the first countries in the
Asian region to initiate and promote an active program for the overseas
employment of its nationals.1  Since the 1960s, about two million overseas
employment opportunities for Koreans were provided. Remittances gen-
erated by overseas employment helped Korea to fund investment projects
necessary for its economic development in the 1970s and 1980s (Kim and
Choi, 1985; Y. Park, 1990). Hence, most of the Korean workers went abroad
knowing what kinds of jobs they had and how much they would earn.  Note
that a substantial number of people migrate without having a job waiting
for them in rural-to-urban migration or in the cases of undocumented
workers even in the international migration context.
Third, a policy on guestworkers can be part of the country’s overall
industrial policy since the import of unskilled foreign labor is often closely
related to the process of industrial restructuring. Singapore is one of the
countries which has used guestworkers as a buffer against external shocks.
The current foreign labor policy of Korea should also be understood in the
context of its industrial policies. To some extent, Korea has helped to speed
up the process of its industrial upgrading by not opening its labor markets
in a legalized manner (Y. Park, 1991a).
Need for Foreign Labor
In Korea, once a major labor-exporting country, the opening of the labor
market to foreign labor has been discussed recently as labor shortages in
certain areas have occurred. The unemployment rate was 2.5 percent, 2.6
percent, 2.4 percent and 2.3 percent, for 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991,
respectively. Labor shortages are more serious in labor-intensive indus-
tries such as clothing, small and medium industries and the construction
1  The Korean case is to some extent unique in that overseas construction projects were also
promoted by the government along with overseas employment.
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industry.  For example, a Ministry of Labor survey showed that only 8 out
of 10 jobs were filled in establishments with 10 to 29 employees in the
manufacturing sector in 1990.
Employment of foreign workers in Korea has been very limited. Legal
status for employment is offered only to those involved in journalism,
technology transfer, business, capital investment, education and research,
and entertainment, or for employment that is recommended by a govern-
ment minister.  Current immigration law does not allow unskilled foreign
labor to enter Korea. Nevertheless, it is believed that a large number of
unskilled foreign workers have entered Korea in the last few years. Most
undocumented workers enter with a short term visa (usually a tourist visa),
then extend their visa once and leave Korea.
In the last few years, the number of illegal workers apprehended has
increased significantly, from 255 in 1988 to 450 in 1989 and to 1,018 in 1990.
These figures are believed to represent only a small portion of the actual
number of undocumented foreign workers in Korea, which is estimated to
be at least 100,000. When the Korean government offered amnesty to
undocumented foreign workers in June 1992, 66,126 foreigners reported to
the authorities, — 22,035 Chinese,  18,983 Filipinos,  8,950 Bangladeshis,
5,036 Nepalese and  6,112 others.  At first, these self-reported workers were
only allowed to stay in Korea until December 31, 1992. Then the govern-
ment allowed them to stay for another six months because industries found
it difficult to replace them with Korean workers.
There appears to be no consensus on the issue of foreign labor even
among different government ministries, largely because the economic and
social impact is expected to be quite substantial.  The Ministry of Trade and
Industry, and the Ministry of Energy and Resources agree with businesses’
claim that foreign workers should be imported in order to ease the current
labor shortage.  On the other hand, the Ministry of Labor as well as the
Ministry of Justice oppose this practice.  The Ministry of Labor argues that
most of the current labor shortages can be solved by utilizing domestic
human resources.  Trade unions also oppose the import of foreign labor.
They argue that foreign workers could cause working conditions to
deteriorate and take jobs away from marginal Korean workers.
Should Korea accept foreign labor for its sustained economic develop-
ment?  The answer is yes.  Without foreign workers, the Korean economy
cannot sustain certain vital sectors that will continue to be needed for its
economic development.
First, the number of undocumented foreign workers is substantial, as
mentioned above.  The period of stay for amnestied workers was extended
to ensure the survival of the sectors which employed them.  Y. Park (1993)
showed that Korean employers who hired foreign employees needed them
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very badly.  Most of them could hardly manage without foreign workers
because they could neither find willing Korean workers nor did they have
enough capital to relocate abroad for cheap labor.
Second, more local workers are leaving than entering the mining and
manufacturing sectors.  It is here that  foreign workers are most likely to be
needed.  For production jobs, there were more people  separating than were
newly employed, while for nonproduction jobs, there were more workers
finding new jobs than leaving their jobs (Table 1). In the mining and
manufacturing sectors, there were also more workers separating than
newly employed. For example, for male production workers in manufac-
turing in 1991, on average, the accession rate was 3.84 percent, while the
separation rate was 4.25 percent.
TABLE 1
WORKERS’ TURNOVER RATES BY INDUSTRY AND OCCUPATION, 1991
(IN PERCENT)
                                                      Male                    Female
                   Accession      Separation                  Accession      Separation
Nonproduction
   All industries 2.36 2.18 3.08 2.97
    Manufacturing 2.24 2.24 3.44 3.43
    Electricity, gas, water 1.17 0.87 1.85 1.46
    Construction 2.82 2.06 3.17 2.88
 Production
    All industries 3.77 4.19 4.04 4.91
    Manufacturing 3.84 4.25 4.04 4.91
    Electricity, gas, water 1.43 1.11 1.43 1.43
    Construction 2.98 2.79 6.03 7.65
Wholesale & retail trade, 2.86 2.84 3.98 3.99
     restaurants & hotels
Transport, storage, 2.36 2.30 2.93 2.85
     communication
Financing, insurance, 2.78 2.12 2.87 2.62
     estate, & business services
Community, social and 1.74 1.69 2.17 2.01
     personal services
SOURCE:  Ministry of Labor, Report on Monthly Labor Survey, December 1991.
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This trend has intensified since the late 1980s.  The separation rate in
the manufacturing sector for establishments with more than 9 employees
began to surpass its accession rate in 1989 (Table 2). Since the last quarter
of 1991, the number of workers employed in manufacturing has decreased.
Between the third quarter of 1991 and the third quarter of 1992, the number
of workers employed in the manufacturing industry decreased by about
200,000. Employment dropped more for the labor-intensive manufactur-
ing sector and female workers.  Considering that more labor shortages are
observed in labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, reasons for many
workers leaving the manufacturing industry must be found mostly from
the supply side of the labor market. A survey by the Ministry of Labor
showed that in 1991 the labor shortage rate of manufacturing was 7.02
percent while that of all industries was 5.48 percent.2
    Since 1989, under a structural adjustment program more than 20,000
coal miners left the workplace due to the shutdown of more than 200 mines.
Less than 20 percent of the miners who left under the program opted to be
reemployed in other coal mines.  For Korea’s coal industry, strategic to the
country’s energy needs, foreign labor should be imported or the price of
coal should be increased.
    Third, foreign workers now employed in Korea are not substitutes
for  Korean workers.  Rather they complement domestic labor in the sense
that they are taking jobs which most Korean workers would not accept.  A
2 A labor shortage rate is defined as the number of workers needed which cannot be found
divided by the number of currently employed workers based on a survey of establishments
with more than 9 workers.
TABLE 2
TRENDS IN WORKERS’ TURNOVER RATES BY INDUSTRY, 1980-91
(IN PERCENT)
                         All Industries          Manufacturing        Elec., Gas, Water          Construction
                      Accsn.        Sep.       Accsn.           Sep.         Accsn.         Sep.        Accsn.         Sep.
1980 4.4 4.8 4.9 5.9 1.7 1.5 4.9 4.9
1983 4.7 4.3 5.4 5.0 1.1 1.5 4.9 4.9
1985 3.7 3.9 4.4 4.5 1.5 1.3 3.8 4.7
1987 3.8 3.6 4.6 4.3 1.2 1.1 3.4 3.9
1989 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.8 1.4 1.1 3.3 2.9
1990 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.9 1.4 0.9 3.1 2.4
1991 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.9 1.3 1.0 2.9 2.3
SOURCE: Ministry of Labor.
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survey of Filipino workers, the second largest group of foreign workers,
showed that the workers surveyed earned on average 338,000 Korean won
in September 1992. This is about 43.7 percent of the monthly total wages of
Korean workers in the manufacturing sector in 1991.3 Males (354,000
Korean won) earned more than females (312,000 Korean won). Filipino
workers’ wages also show little difference depending on workers’ or
employers’ characteristics, compared to those of Korean workers. For
example, Korean university graduates earn almost twice the amount of
Korean high school graduates, while Filipino workers with a university
degree earn almost the same as Filipino middle school graduates. This
implies that most  Filipino workers are employed in unskilled occupations
where their education is not appreciated (Y. Park, 1993).
Fourth, the current labor shortage problem to some extent was consid-
ered to be attributed to the fast economic growth achieved since the mid-
1980s, despite unstable industrial relations and the poor performance of
the export sector.  In 1992, the growth rate of Korea’s real GNP is expected
to be under five percent. However, there are still some jobs which Korean
workers would not accept under existing working conditions.  This is why
the Korean government extended the period of stay of undocumented
foreign workers until June 1993.
Fifth, labor shortages in some sectors cannot be solved by utilizing
domestic human resources.  One of the policy instruments proposed by the
Ministry of Labor to ease the labor shortages is the use of the female labor
force.  An Economic Planning Board’s survey revealed that, in 1989, there
were 1,690,000 potential unemployed workers and 77.9 percent of them
were female.  Based on this survey, the Ministry of Labor argues that the
labor shortage problem can be solved by bringing only some of these latent
unemployed, most of whom are expected to be women, into the labor
market. However, necessary conditions for facilitating female employ-
ment are hard to meet.  For instance, establishing a large number of day-
care centers nationwide does not appear likely in the near future.
In fact, the female participation rate in economic activities has de-
creased since the second quarter of 1992, reflecting the slowdown of the
Korean economy in recent years. This implies that utilizing the female labor
force is not a good practical solution for the current labor shortages, at least
in some sectors.
Finally, firms have several options as they face rising wages in the
domestic market. One is to import labor. Alternatively, they could change
their production technologies to economize on the use of domestic labor.
Firms could also relocate their production facilities to take advantage of
3 This is based on the 1991 Occupational Wage Survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor.
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cheap labor.  A survey on Korean firms’ direct foreign investment by the
Ministry of Finance revealed that in 1992, 73.6 percent of cases of outward
investment by Korean firms was done by small business, which increased
by 30.5 percent compared to 1991. The proportion of small investment,
whose amount was not more than $1 million, also constituted 81.7 percent
of all cases. The manufacturing sector provided 68.8 percent  of the cases
and 72 percent were in the Southeast Asian region.  This sharp increase in
direct foreign investment in Southeast Asian countries by Korean small
manufacturers also indicates that some sectors of the Korean economy
cannot be sustained only by utilizing domestic labor.
Demographic Change, Labor Mobility and
Economic Development
Korea’s high economic growth has been possible, to a large extent, due to
abundant and cheap labor. With scarce natural resources, Korea achieved
competitiveness in international markets through the use of cheap labor.
However, this large supply of unskilled labor was no longer available in the
mid-1970s when Korea passed its turning point in domestic migration.
The discussion on the previous section indicates that Korea has also
reached a turning point in international migration.  This section focuses on
how Korea reached this turning point in the context of demographic change
and industrial upgrading.
Labor Force Structure and Educational Attainment
The age structure of the Korean population, which was in the form of a
pyramid until 1960, assumed the shape of a bell in the early 1980s and is
expected to transform into the shape of a jar in the late 1990s due to
decreasing birth rates and the increased life span of Koreans since 1960.
The proportion of the population below age 14 is projected to decrease to
25 percent in the year 2000.  On the other hand, the share of the 15-64 age
cohort will increase to 69 percent in the year 2000.  Of all the age cohorts,
the share of the age cohort above 55, which is generally considered as the
retirement age in Korea, will grow as the proportion of the age cohort below
25 shrinks.
As a result of the structural change in the labor force, the Korean
economy is experiencing a short supply of young workers as well as the
aging of workers.
Cheap and abundant young workers migrating from rural areas to
urban areas fueled rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s.  How-
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ever, this abundant labor supply has ceased since the mid-1970s when
Korea passed the turning point as described by Lewis.  The 15-24 age cohort
grew annually at 3.99 percent, as compared to 1.75 percent for the total
population in the 1970s, then at 0.59 ( total population, 1.66) percent in the
1980s (Table 3). The annual growth rate of that age group is projected to
drop to -0.77 percent in the 1990s.  The birth rate decreased from 6.0 percent
in 1960 to 2.7 percent in 1981 due to the successful family planning project
implemented in Korea since 1962.  Thus, the number of the 15-24 age cohort
will shrink by the year 2000.
TABLE 3
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN AGE COMPOSITION OF POPULATION, 1970-2000
                     Age Cohort
Year                Up to 14       15-24         25-34         35-44         45-54          55-64          65+        Total
Population (in thousands)
1970 13,241 5,611 4,398 3,316 2,309 1,520 1,039 31,434
1980 12,659 8,290 5,601 4,355 3,108 1,947 1,446 37,406
1990 12,505 8,799 8,419 5,410 4,198 2,712 2,074 44,117
2000 12,387 8,141 8,219 8,641 5,169 3,764 3,034 49,355
Annual Growth Rates (in percent)
1970-1980 -0.45 3.99 2.45 2.77 3.02 2.51 3.37 1.75
1980-1990 -0.12 0.59 4.16 2.19 3.05 3.36 3.67 1.66
1990-2000 -0.09 -0.77 0.26 4.27 2.10 3.34 3.88 1.13
SOURCE:  Korea Institute for Population and Health, Korea Year 2000: Prospect and Issues for
Long-Term Development (Population and Health), 1985.
Fewer young people have participated in economic activities since more
opportunities for higher education have become available. The participa-
tion rate of males (females) in the 15-19 age cohort has decreased from 35.6
(34.3) percent in 1971, to 33.5 (36.9) percent, to 13.6 (20.2) percent in 1986,
then to 11.0 (18.9) percent in 1991.
 In the 1990s, the 20-24 age cohort will be much less active because more
young people will go to college. As of 1992, more than 90 percent of the
young workers who newly entered the market had a high school diploma.
The proportion of high school graduates (university graduates) in Korea’s
labor force increased from 22.7 (6.7) percent, to 31.3 (10.7) percent in 1985,
then to 39.2(14.6) percent in 1991.
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The short supply of young workers combined with the high educa-
tional attainment, which is a major contributing factor for Korea’s fast
economic growth, are some of the factors which explain why Korea has
been experiencing pressure to bring in foreign workers for unskilled jobs
in recent years.
Labor Mobility and Industrial Structure
Since the 1960s, employment in Korea has grown annually at 3.3 percent
mainly due to the employment generation initiated by the growth of the
manufacturing sector (Table 4). However, in 1992, employment in manu-
TABLE 4
MAJOR LABOR MARKET INDICATORS, 1965-1992 (IN PERCENT)
                        1965-69     70-74     75-79      80-84     85-89         90           91           921
Population growth   rate 2.43 1.92 1.59 1.37 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.91
Fertility  rate 5.40 4.30 3.50 2.80 1.60 1.60 1.60 -
Growth rate of econ. 3.20 4.14 3.52 1.19 3.69 2.87 2.84 2.26
     active pop.
Econ. active rate 44.8 55.8 57.0 55.9 58.0 60.0 60.6 60.9
Emp.  growth  rate
     All industries 3.82 3.94 3.57 1.19 3.95 3.00 2.99 2.18
     Manufacturing 14.32 10.14 9.59 1.68 7.73 0.15 1.84 -2.93
     SOC & other services 7.26 4.24 7.84 4.47 5.39 8.30 7.67 6.10
Emp. output  elasticity2
     All industries n.a. 0.46 0.37 0.15 0.41 0.33 0.36 0.38
     Manufacturing n.a. 0.51 0.50 0.38 0.65 0.02 0.22 -0.45
     SOC & other services n.a. 0.35 0.64 0.56 0.52 0.71 0.79 1.16
Unemployment  rate 6.1 4.3 3.8 4.4 3.2 2.4 2.3 2.5
SOURCE:  Bank of Korea, Yearbook of Economic Statistics (various years). Office of Statistics,
Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey (various years). Cited from Kim and
Kwon (1992).
NOTES:  1 Between the 1st quarter and the third quarter.
2 Employment growth rate/GDP growth rate.
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facturing began to decrease, reflecting the industrial upgrading of the
Korean economy.
Agricultural employment started to decline in the mid-1970s. In 1981
employment in agriculture increased mainly because manufacturing em-
ployment declined that year reflecting the negative growth of Korea’s
economy of the previous year. Since 1982, employment has continued to
decrease at an even faster pace than in the past. In 1992, the proportion of
agricultural employment to total employment decreased to 17.6 percent.
Migration explains the decline in agricultural employment.  Rural-to-
urban migration contributed to the increase in the urban labor force by 1.4
million between 1977 and 1980 and by 2.4 million between 1982 and 1984
(Park and Castaneda, 1987).  In the late 1960s, farmers migrated because the
terms of trade in agriculture deteriorated and employment prospects in
manufacturing were good (Table 5). From 1972 to 1976 urban migration
slowed mainly because the terms of trade in agriculture improved and
TABLE 5
RATIOS OF PRICES RECEIVED AND PAID BY FARMERS, 1966-1985
(IN PERCENT)
                Prices received/         Price received/
                  prices paid by          prices of farm                    Price received/
                       farmers1               supplies2          wages
1966 90.0 78.6 202.5
1970 94.2 82.1 168.9
1975 105.7 99.2 168.2
1976 105.2 91.0 165.1
1977 104.8 88.7 155.2
1978 105.0 80.8 142.8
1979 102.4 93.6 105.1
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 99.8 86.0 103.6
1982 95.0 83.1 106.4
1983 89.8 74.7 102.8
1984 92.7 84.5 97.9
SOURCE:  Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1985. Cited from
Park and Castaneda (1987).
NOTES:  1 Prices received for sales of grains (including potatoes), fruits and vegetables,
livestock and poultry products.
 2 Prices paid for purchases of farm supplies, household goods, and farm labor.
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urban unemployment increased. Between 1977 and 1980 more people
migrated to urban areas because manufacturing and services expanded.
Since 1982, rural-to-urban migration has increased tremendously since the
terms of trade in agriculture have declined rapidly and the performance of
the Korean economy, which started to recover beginning in 1982, has been
very good. The decline in the agricultural terms of trade was mainly due
to the government’s elimination of a large share of its price supports for rice
and other crops and subsidies to inputs in 1980.
As a result of the continued migration from rural areas to urban areas,
the proportion of the age cohort above 49 in the agriculture sector grew to
more than 50 percent. For example, as Table 6 shows, in 1989, that
proportion was 53 percent in the agriculture sector, while it was 22.1
percent in all industries.
TABLE 6
TREND IN AGE STRUCTURE, 1965-89 (IN PERCENT)
             Age Cohort
                                     15-19        20-29       30-39          40-49         50-59         60+
1965       All industries 13.3 25.3 25.0 20.5 11.9 4.0
                Agriculture & fishery 14.2 25.8 22.1 19.3 13.6 5.0
1970       All industries 13.4 21.3 27.5 21.5 11.8 4.5
                Agriculture & fishery 13.2 18.4 26.0 21.8 14.2 6.4
1975       All industries 11.9 23.2 26.2 20.5 13.1 5.1
                Agriculture & fishery 11.5 17.7 22.1 22.1 18.0 8.6
1980       All industries 7.6 25.7 25.3 23.3 12.9 5.2
                Agriculture & fishery 4.9 15.5 19.3 28.1 21.0 11.2
1985       All industries 4.2 27.2 26.6 22.5 13.6 5.9
                Agriculture & fishery 1.8 13.4 18.2 26.7 24.8 15.1
1989       All industries 3.5 25.0 27.6 21.8 15.3 6.8
                Agriculture & fishery 0.8 7.7 16.2 22.3 31.1 21.9
SOURCE:  National Bureau of Statistics, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population
Survey (various years).
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It should be noted also that fewer people migrate to the manufacturing
sector than to the service sector including S.O.C. For example, between
November 1988 and November 1989, from the agriculture and fishery
sector, 28,000 and 54,000 workers moved to the manufacturing and service
sectors, respectively (Table 7). This trend was intensified during the 1980s.
Until recent years, manufacturing was  a major source of employment
growth since Korea started its industrialization in the 1960s. Its employ-
ment generation rate was greater than the growth rate of employment of all
industries until the late 1980s (Table 4).
The annual growth of manufacturing employment has fluctuated,
growing about 10 percent in the 1970s, decreasing to 1.7 percent between
1980 and 1984, increasing again to 7.7 percent between 1985 and 1989, and
starting to decrease beginning in 1990. In 1992, the growth rate of manufac-
turing employment was -2.9 percent. The growth rate of manufacturing
employment has continued to decrease since the Korean manufacturing
sector started to transform from a labor-intensive industry to an increas-
ingly capital-intensive form around the mid-1970s. The share of heavy
manufacturing output (defined as the sum of chemical products, nonme-
tallic mineral products, basic metal industries and fabricated metal prod-
ucts, machinery and equipment) in terms of GDP at constant prices
increased from 40.4 percent in 1970, to 49.6 percent in 1974, to 55.8 percent
in 1979, to 58.5 percent in 1985, then to 64.8 percent in 1988.  As a result, its
employment output elasticity decreased from 0.50 in the 1970s to 0.38 in the
first half of the 1980s, and increased to 0.65 in the latter half of the 1980s,
then decreased again in the 1990s.
In addition, the pattern of change in the employment output elasticity
in manufacturing in the 1980s can be explained by the fluctuation in
manufacturing output in the same period.  Manufacturing GNP increased
annually at around 15-20 percent until 1978, but it annual growth rate
between 1979 and 1985 was only 6.8 percent.  The economic performance
of the Korean economy in the mid-1980s led by its strong manufacturing
sector was excellent and to some degree led to overheating.  In particular,
the sudden increase in manufacturing output employment elasticity in the
latter half of the 1980s is to a large extent due to the good performance of
the light industry export sector.  The rate of increase in the export of light
industry goods was double-digit consecutively in 1986, 1987 and 1988
(Table 8).  The Bank of Korea estimated that the potential annual growth
rate of GNP between 1989 and 1991 should have been 6.8 percent, while the
actual growth rate was 8.2 percent.  This indicates that high manufacturing
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employment absorption in the second half of the 1980s should be consid-
ered to some extent as being not normal.4
The sudden drop in manufacturing employment in the 1990s is due to
the supply side effects as well as the demand side ones. In 1989, 1990 and
1991, respectively, the GNP growth rate of the manufacturing sector
increased 3.7 percent, 8.4 percent and 9.1 percent, while that of the
construction industry was 16.1 percent, 22.2 percent and 23.7 percent.  This
implies that more employment opportunities were created in the high-
paying sectors.
Supply side factors also explain the decrease in manufacturing em-
ployment.  First of all, in the 1980s, Korea neglected the vocational training
of industrial skilled manpower and overemphasized general and/or
commercial subjects in high school. As of 1990, about 90 percent of labor
market entrants had at least a high school diploma. However, most of them
graduated from high schools which offered education mainly for college
entrance exams and/or trained students for commercial jobs. In the 1980s,
the number of industrial high school graduates remained at about 60,000.
The supply of industrial skilled manpower through vocational training
even decreased from 89,000 in 1980 to 54,000 in 1989.
Second, there exist substantial differentials in wages and in social
status between production and nonproduction workers in Korea, com-
pared to other countries in a similar stage of economic development. For
example, as of 1989, the ratio of average monthly wages of an administra-
tive job, which most production workers rarely have the opportunity to get,
compared to a production job, was 2.6.  The ratio was 3.9 in 1980.  However,
a large number of new entrants into the labor market still prefer
nonproduction jobs. Even though the gap has shrunk substantially since
the mid-1980s, it was estimated in a 1989 study that the lifetime wages of
a male high school graduate were still 62.7 percent of those of a male
university graduate.
Third, the labor force, in particular the youngest cohort, has moved
from the manufacturing sector, characterized as dirty, dangerous and
demanding, to the service sector as Korea’s industrial structure has been
upgraded. A survey showed that one out of five workers of the age cohort
below 26 in manufacturing wanted another job (Uh, 1993).
Reflecting all these changes, in net terms, with Korea’s industrial
upgrading, workers migrated from the agriculture and fishery sector, to
the manufacturing and mining sector, then to the service sector. In 1970,
4 Some argue that the good performance of the Korean economy in the latter half of the 1980s
was mainly due to a favorable external environment such as low oil prices and the devalued
Korean won in the same period.
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more than 50 percent of workers were employed in the agriculture and
fishery sector. In 1985, more than 50 percent of workers began to work for
the service sector. In 1986, workers employed in mining and manufactur-
ing started to outnumber those in the agriculture and fishery industries.  In
1992, manufacturing employment began to decrease.
Hah and Oh (1992) argued that recent developments in the employ-
ment structure of the service sector did not help the international competi-
tiveness of Korean goods since the share of employment in the final-
consumption sector, including restaurants and the hotel business, ex-
panded rapidly while that in the industry-dependent sector decreased.  It
should also be noted that the agriculture sector cannot serve as a major
supplier of unskilled workers anymore, considering the age structure of the
agricultural workers.
Employment Adjustment, Economic Restructuring and
International Migration
Fields (1994) argues that a well-integrated labor market among the Asian
NICs including Korea contributed to the decline in emigration pressure in
these countries. His argument should be understood in the following
contexts in the Korean case. The flexible labor market helped the economy
to adjust itself against external shocks including oil shocks as well as
structural adjustment. Then, due to the successful performance of the
economy, enough employment opportunities to absorb their nationals
were provided in the domestic labor market. As a result, the continued
decline in emigration pressure over a long period of time has been
observed.  This context is described well in Fields’ article.5
It should be noted that, in Korea, international migration also contrib-
uted to the flexibility of the Korean labor market. In this section, this context
is analyzed with a special reference to government policies. The policy
regarding guestworkers is also discussed in the context of economic
structural adjustment. Before moving to these issues, the overall economic
impact of Korea’s overseas migration, which had played an important role
until the mid-1980s, is reviewed.
Overseas Migration and Korea’s Economic Development
Since the early 1960s, about two million Koreans have gone overseas for
temporary employment. This large flow of international migration was
5 The flexibility of the Korean labor market is well documented in other studies (Wan and
Fields, 1989; Fields, 1992; and Topel and Kim, 1992).
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initiated and has been extensively pursued by the government as one of the
action programs for Korea’s fast economic development. International
migration brought positive as well as negative impacts on Korea’s eco-
nomic development process.
Until the mid-1980s, Korea suffered from chronic deficits in its balance
of payments. Remittances earned through overseas employment, which
amounted to almost US$20 billion, were instrumental in improving the
balance of payments. For example, in 1982 when remittances peaked, the
ratio between  remittances and exports was 8.9 percent. Remittances from
overseas employment also helped to fund major investment projects
necessary for the fast industrial upgrading.6
Nearly two million overseas employment opportunities were offered.
Considering the size of Korea’s labor market, this number may not be that
crucial. However, in the late 1960s when an abundant labor surplus still
existed, employment in Vietnam contributed to reducing unemployment
in the domestic market. In the early 1980s, overseas employment also
helped the labor market adjust in times of economic difficulties. In addi-
tion, employment opportunities appeared to be good for most Korean
workers in the 1960s and 1970s. During that period the wages of overseas
migrant workers were usually three to four times higher than those of
equivalent workers in the domestic market.
On the other hand, overseas migration brought about a number of
negative impacts on the Korean economy.  Those include the large increase
in remittances from Korean workers in the Middle East and wage hikes in
the domestic construction market, which in part resulted from the overseas
employment of a large number of Korean construction workers, which
contributed to speeding up the very rapid inflation in the late 1970s (Y.
Park, 1990b).
Labor Market Adjustment and Overseas Migration
A way to look at the labor market flexibility of an economy is to see how the
labor market adjusts in the period of economic slowdown. In Korea, the
early 1980s is considered as one of the periods when Korea underwent a
structural adjustment. After the second oil shock of 1979, Korea experi-
enced a negative GNP growth in 1981 (for the first time since it started
development planning) as well as double-digit inflation. Its exports suf-
fered a drawback in major overseas markets.
6 Note that the Korean government exercised some policy measures to encourage Korean
workers to send remittances, including requiring Korean companies to pay a large portion of
wages in Korean currency directly to workers' families in Korea.
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In this period of structural adjustment, the labor market in Korea
adjusted itself reasonably well. Despite the slower employment genera-
tion, the rates of unemployment had been maintained at acceptable levels
of around five percent. Real wages dropped in the period of 1980-1981 and
began to rise again with the recovery of the Korean economy. This
successful labor market adjustment also helped with the management of
Korea’s overall structural adjustment (Park and Castaneda, 1987).
Given reasonably well-integrated labor markets in Korea, a number of
factors related to government policies contributed to this success. First of
all,  at the government’s initiative, Korea began to send its nationals for
overseas employment beginning in the early 1960s. In the mid-1970s,
overseas employment of Korean workers took a big jump with the rise in
construction project orders from the Middle East. International migration
by Korean workers peaked in the early 1980s when Korea needed a lot of
jobs due to external shocks (Table 9). In 1980, the Korean government
enacted various policy measures to boost labor exports which had sub-
sided in the late 1970s. These instruments included equalizing the mini-
mum wages between domestic and foreign hiring agencies. Second, one of
the other factors to help the flexibility of the Korean labor market was the
slow growth of the population, especially the size of the population 14 years
and over. The annual growth rate of the population 14 years and over was
2.98 percent between 1975 and 1980, while it was 2.35 percent between 1980
and 1985. This is mainly due to the fact that Korea is one of the countries
whose government implemented a successful family planning program.
Korea’s fertility rate dropped to around four percent by the 1970s.
Third, the continued decline in the labor participation rate of the
younger age group, who began to account for a greater share of the total
population, helped to ease emigration pressure. For example, the partici-
pation rate of the age cohort between 20 and 24 dropped from 76.4 percent
in 1980 to 64.7 percent in 1984. This reflects the rapid increase in school
enrollment with Korea’s sustained high economic growth. In particular,
the substantial expansion in the college enrollment quota by the govern-
ment, which took place in 1980 with the birth of the Fifth Republic,
increased the number of college students including those attending two-
year colleges from 560,000 in 1980 to 1.2 million in 1985.7  Table 10 shows
the effect of increased enrollment on the labor supply. The ratio between
the additional high school and college enrollment and the additional
population over 14 years of age was about 22 percent each year from 1976
7 It should be mentioned that the expansion in the college enrollment quota was taken not
for helping the labor market adjustment, but for meeting the high demand for education by the
Korean people.
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TABLE 10
ANNUAL CHANGES IN POPULATION 14 YEARS AND OVER AND
ENROLLMENT, 1970-85 (IN THOUSANDS OF PERSONS)
                   Absolute Change
             Year    in Population             Absolute Change
                                           14 and Over                in Enrollment1               (2)/(1)
                                 (1)                             (2)                                      (%)
1970 614 78 12.7
1976 716 160 22.3
1977 787 137 17.3
1978 688 157 22.8
1979 654 157 24.0
1980 657 223 42.9
1981 634 306 48.3
1982 562 258 45.9
1983 599 216 36.1
1984 633 195 39.4
1985 696
SOURCE:  National Bureau of Statistics, Economically Active Population Survey (various
issues). National Bureau of Statistics, Major Statistics of Korean Economy (various issues; quoted
from Park and Castaneda, (1987).
NOTES:  1 Includes high school (general and vocational), junior college, junior teacher’s
college, college and university and graduate school.
 2 Change from 1969.
 3 Change from 1975.
to 1979, while that ratio increased to more than 40 percent from 1980 to
1982.
Fourth, the government stabilization policies including holding down
wage increases also accounted for the successful adjustment of the labor
market.  The wage restraints on government employees’ salaries was one
of the major tools used to induce wage restraint in the private sector. In 1980
and 1981, real wages dropped consecutively.  The decrease in real wages
relieved  the pressure for employers to reduce employment on a large scale.
Therefore, the experiences in the early 1980s tell us that overseas
migration of Korean workers, with a set of well-organized labor as well as
2
3
2
3
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macro policies, helped relieve the pressure to emigrate for employment in
times of economic difficulties.
Industrial Upgrading and Guestworkers
In Korea, some of the arguments against the import of guestworkers
include that guestworkers would make the process of Korea’s industrial
upgrading slower and, if they enter  in  a legalized procedure, they cannot
be used as a buffer against external shocks.  Some even claim that accepting
foreign workers implicitly without recognizing their legal status is the best
policy option concerning guestworkers.
In fact, concerning the opening of the Korean labor market,  the Korean
government has followed this line of argument more or less. Since 1987,
Korea’s wages have more than doubled. The rapidly rising wages com-
bined with unstable industrial relations have been painful for the industrial
sector, in particular small labor-intensive sectors. The government under-
stands fairly well that some of the labor-intensive Korean industries are not
able to invest more capital for upgrading their production process nor go
abroad for cheap labor. With the already invested capital, they have to
continue production within Korea until no other choices but closing down
their factories are left for them.
In 1990 and 1991 when labor shortages were the most serious, the
government did not take any explicit measures concerning guestworkers.
Instead, a large number of foreign workers were allowed to enter Korea
without valid documents. However, it did not recognize even the presence
of undocumented workers until the first part of 1992 when the Korean
economy started to experience slowdown. In June 1992, only those working
for the manufacturing sector who reported to the authorities were entitled
to stay and work until the end of that year. In December 1992, the  period
of stay was extended until June 1993. The government also made immigra-
tion procedures at ports and airports more tight. For example, the number
of Chinese of Korean origin who were admitted through Inchon port
monthly decreased from 29,000 in September 1992 to 17,000 in January
1993, partly due to tighter immigration control at the port.
This series of government measures clearly indicates that the Korean
government aims to use guestworkers to smooth out its economic adjust-
ment process. As well, by limiting the allowed period of stay, the govern-
ment also makes it clear that the slowdown of Korea’s industrial upgrading
due to guestworkers would be accepted to a limited degree.
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Policy Options for Guestworkers
Korea has already passed the turning point in international migration in the
early 1990s. There exist some sectors which cannot be sustained without
foreign labor. Therefore, policymakers should come up with policy options
concerning how and to what extent foreign workers should be allowed. It
would be pointless to discuss whether Korea needs to accept foreign labor,
which has been the case so far, since there already exists a substantial
number of foreign workers in Korea.
Korea should not open its labor market on a large scale. Domestic
human resources could be utilized in a more efficient way, as the govern-
ment argues. Agricultural employment is still quite large compared to
other industrialized countries.8 More than 15 percent of the total employ-
ment is still in this sector. Business might not work hard to upgrade its
industrial structure because of guestworkers. Korea also needs to consider
the possibility of reunification in the future. In North Korea about 50
percent of its labor force is still employed in the agriculture sector, which
could be a major source of unskilled labor when Korean reunification
occurs.
However, the current foreign labor policy, which in nature follows the
Japanese one, is not desirable, either. The foreign labor policy of Korea,
which is to implicitly approve the import of substantial numbers of foreign
laborers, seems to aim at avoiding the possible negative side effects by
legalizing the import of foreign labor, which West Germany experienced in
the early 1970s.  But it should be noted that the negative impact is incurred
by not legalizing the import of foreign labor.
The working conditions and living environments of undocumented
foreign workers are inferior. These foreign workers are paid less than 50
percent compared to Korean workers doing similar jobs. Moreover, for-
eign workers are being exploited, as Y. Park (1993) showed. Some of them
are not paid for their work or are beaten by their employers or Korean
workers. Their work related illnesses and/or injuries are not properly
treated. Only a small number of NGOs have helped foreign workers on
humanitarian grounds, and their contribution has been limited, mainly
due to the lack of financial resources.
Even some businessmen and policymakers believe that Korea should
continue its current policy on foreign labor import.  Without legalizing the
import of foreign labor, they argue, Korea will be able to reduce the possible
8 Note that the shares of agriculture and fishery employment of selected countries in 1972
such as the United States (4.3 percent), the United Kingdom (3.1 pervent), West Germany (7.5
percent) and France (12.7 percent) were quite low compared to 18.3 percent in 1990 for Korea.
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negative economic and social impact of foreign labor, but still utilize
undocumented foreign workers.
The Korean government should consider legalizing foreign workers
for sectors with some structural problems. Foreign workers should be
offered equal treatment with domestic workers. The Korean government
should also make a greater effort to stop the illegal recruitment of foreign
workers. The import of foreign workers as trainees, which is now imple-
mented on a small scale and has been considered for expansion, could be
a policy option.
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